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RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
.In a number of recent cases, arising under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act,1 involving the determination of
what constitutes "unfair methods of competition," the Federal
Courts have had to determine whether a manufacturer may
legally retain or reinstate upon his list of customers wholesalers
and retailers who have cut the manufacturer's suggested resale
prices, upon receiving from the offending dealers assurances that
thereafter the manufacturer's resale prices will be observed.
In prosecutions under the Sherman Act,2 it is well settled
that, in the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a mo-
nopoly, a manufacturer is not violating the terms of the Act,
who exercises his own independent discretion as to the parties
with whom he will deal and refuses to sell to those who will not
resell his products at the prices which he fixes for their resale.3
In the Beechnut decision 4 which arose under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, and from. the facts of which it
did not appear that the Beechnut Company had any kind of
monopoly in the kind of products it manufactured, the majority
cpinion of the Court written by Mr. Justice Day stated that a
manufacturer might not, consistently with the law "go beyond
the exercise of this right, and by contracts or combinations, ex-
press or implied, unduly hinder or obstruct the free and natural
flow of comxnerce in the channels of interstate trade."
5
"Act of Sept. 26, 1914, Ch. 311 (38 Stat. at L. 719). Section 5 pro-
vides in part: "Unfair methods of competition are hereby declared
illegal." "The commission is hereby empowered -and directed to pre-
vent persons, partnerships, or corporations, except banks and common
carriers subject to the acts to regulate commerce, from using unfair
methods of competition."
"Act of July 2, 1890, Ch. 648 (26 Stat. at L. 209).
"United States v. Colgate & Co. (1919), 250 U. S. 300, 39 Sup. Ct.
465, and cases therein cited. See (1922) comments, 31 Yale Law Journal
651.
,ffederal Trade Commission v. Beechnut Packing Co. (1922), 257
U. S. 441, 42 Sup. Ct. 150. See 35 Harv. L. Rev. 772.
"Federal Trade commission v. Beechnut Packing Co., supra, 257
U. S. at p. 453. The precise holding of the case was that the commission
under section 5 of the Federal Trade Comission Act might properly re-
quire the Beechnut Company to cease and desist "from carrying into
effect its so-calleff Beechnut policy by cooperative methods in which the
respondent and its distributors, customers and agents undertake to pre-
vent others from obtaining the company's products at less than the
prices designated by it: (a) By the practice of reporting the names of
dealers who do not observe such resale prices; (b) by causing dealers
to be enrolled upon lists of undesirable purchasers who are not to be
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As a corollary of the first principle it follows that a manu-
facturer may make known generally to the trade the prices at
which he desires the goods resold, and may say to the price-
cutter: "I have struck you off my list and will sell you no
more.''6 If, however, the price-cutter replies: "I will cease
cutting your prices, if you will retain or reinstate me on your
list," may a contract to maintain prices be implied from the as-
surance so given, which is illegal under the definition of the law
contained in the prevailing opinion in the Beechnut case?
As one Court has observed: "There seems to be no reason
why this exclusion must 'be permanent, nor is it obvious that any
principle of public policy requires the price-cutter to be forever
barred from handling these goods. Yet the difference between
his express promise to observe the price hereafter and the im-
plied promise which he quite obviously makes to the same effect,
if he asks the acceptance of a further order, is not a sharp dis-
tinction. "7
In six cases s in the lower Federal Courts since the Beechnut
-decision, in one of which a writ or certiorari was denied by the
supplied with the products of the company unless and until they have
given satisfactory assurances of their purpose to maintain such desig-
nated prices in the future; (c) by employing salesmen or agents to
assist in such plan by reporting dealers who do not observe such resale
prices, and giving orders to dealers who sell at less than such prices;
(d) by utilizing numbers and symbols marked upon casbs containing
their produdts with a view to ascertaining the names of dealers who sell
the company's products at less than such prices in order to prevent
such dealers from obtaining the products of the cor'npany; or (e) by
utilizing any equivalent cooperative means of accomplishing the main-
tenance of prices fixed by the company." 257 U. S. at pp. 455-456. Of
this holding of the Supreme Court it is said in Toledo Pipe.Threading
Machine Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (1926, C. C. A. 6th Cir.), 11
Fed. 2d. Series 337 at p. 341: "Whether it intended its condemnation to
go to any one of the elements separately, or only to the combination of
them all, may not be clear, though the use of the disjunctive 'or' would
indicate the former." See Dunn Resale Price Maintenance (1923), 32
Yale Law Journal at pp. 702-705, and 40 Harv. L. Rev. 139.
United States v. Colgate & Co., supra, 250 U. S. at p. 307
Circuit Judge Denison in Toledo Pipe-Threading Machine Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission, supra, Note 4, 11 Fed. 2d Series at p. 342.
3 Hills Bros. v. Federal Trade Commission (1926, C. C. A. 9th Cir.),
9 Fed. 2d Series 481, writ of certiorari denied by Supreme Court (1926),
70 L. Ed. 539; Cream of Wheat Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C. C.
A. 8th Cir. 1926), 14 Fed. 2d Series 40; Q. R. S. Music Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission (1926 C. C. A. 7th Cir.), 12 Fed. 2d Series 730; Moir
v. Federal Trade Commission (1926 C. C. A., 1st Cir.), 12 Fed. 2d Series
22; Toledo Pipe-Threading Machine Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
supra, Note 5; Oppenheim, Oberndorf & Co., Inc. v. Federal Trade Com.
mission (1925 C. C. A., 4th Cir.), 5 Fed. 2d Series 574. See also Butteric
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Supreme Court without opinion, systems of resale price main-
tenance found in various degrees to be similar to the so-called
Beechnut plan, have been condemned as unfair nethods of com-
petition. These cases have not involved the element of monopoly
or of intent to mpnopolize, but in each, among a complex of other
circumstances, the facts disclosed that it was the manufacturer's
usual practice to investigate reported instances of price-cutting
and only retain or reinstate the alleged price-cutter on his list of
customers upon satisfactory assurances from the price-cutter that
thereafter he would maintain resale prices.
A contrary result was reached in two cases recently decided
by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the -Second Circuit. Amer-
ican Tobacco Co. v. Federal Trade Commission9 and H. H. Ayer
Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission.10 In the Ayer case the man-
ufacturer in a few instances reinstated offending price-cutters
upon his list upon assurances to maintain prices, but the Court
held that these instances were only occasional deviations from
the defendant's general merchandising, practice, and conse-
quently did not constitute an unfair method of competition
within the meaning of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act.
The Supreme Court has defined "unfair method of competi-
tion" as used in the Federal Trade Com~mission Act as not to in-
clude anything not already regarded as unlawful at the time of
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission' (C. C. A. 2d Cir. 1925), 4 Fed. 2d
Series 910; and A. H. Grebe d Co. v. Siegel (D. C. R. I. 1926), 14 Fed.
2d Series 175.
• (1925 C. C. A. 2d Cir.) 9 Fed. 2d Series 570, writ of certiorari
granted by Supreme Court without opinion (1926), 70 L. Ed. 395. This
case, wrhich is mentioned only for the reference, need not be noticed
further, as it does not appear from the court's opinion, delivered by
Circuit Judge Rogers, that there was any proof that the defendant, the
American Tobacco Company sought or obtained asurances from offend-
ing price-cutters to maintain resale prices.
(1926, C. C. A. 2d Cir.) 15 Fed. 2d 274. From the opinion of court,
it would appear in only a few instances had the manufacturer actually
received assurances from price-cutters that they would offend no more.
Circuit Judge Rogers in delivering the opinion of the court stated:
"No court has gone so far as to hold that an occasional instance in the
business career of a firm as where an agent has solicited or urged a
retailer not to cut prices, amounts to an unfair business policy or con-
stitutes a method of merchandising which is condemned by the act."
"Out of thousands of sales made with some eight thousand customers,
but a few are referred to as instances to eliminate the price-cutting.
In doing this, we think the petitioner did no more than it might law-
fully do in selecting its customers whom it considered desirable." 15
Fed. 2d. Series at pp. 277 and 278.
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the passage of the Act."1  While practices may be "unfair
methods of competition" as "against public jiolicy because of
their dangerous tendency unduly to hinder competition or create
monopoly" the term.was left purposely indefinite in the statute
so as to cover other practices not forbidden under the Anti-Trust
Laws,12 but regarded as opposed to good morals, "because char-
acterized by deception, bad faith, fraud or oppression.''13
As the cases on price maintenance have not involved mo-
nopoly or the intent to monopolize, except such monopoly of his
own goods as the manufacturer has with full assent of the law,
viz.: that no other manufacturer may legally put out similar
articles bearing the same brand, and as the elements of decep-
tion, bad faith and fraud are not involved, it would appear that
the practice is an unfair method of competition either because
(a) it tends unduly to hinder competition or (b) involves co-
ercion.
As was pointed out by Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissenting
opinion in the Beechnut1 4 ease, maintenance of resale prices does
not hinder competition between a manufacturer and his com-
petitors. The only competition affected is competition between
the various jobbers and dealers who handle the manufacturer's
products. Whether it is in the public interest that this sort of
competition be free and untrammeled is an economic question.1 5
"Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz (1920), 253 U. S. 421.
1 This term is defined in section I of the Clayton Act to include
both the Sherman Act and the Supplementary Clayton Act (Act of
Oct. 15, 1914, 38 Stat. at L. 730).
'Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, supra, at p. 427. See Federal
Trade Commission v. Winsted Hosiery Company (1922), 258 U. S. 483.
See also on the general subject Haines Efforts to Define Unfair Competi.-
tion (1919), 29 Yale Law Journal 1, and 35 Harv. L. Rev. at pp. 830-833.
21 See 257 U. S. at p. 457: "So far as the Sherman Act is concerned
I had supposed that its policy was aimed against attempts to create a
monopoly in the doers of the condemned act or to hinder competition
with them. Of course there can be nothing of that sort here. The re-
spondent already has the monopoly of its own goods with the full as-
sent of the law, and no one can compete with regard to those goods,
which are the only ones concerned. . . . I cannot see how it is un-
fair competition to say to those to whom the respondent sells and to
,the world, you cam have my goods only on the terms that I propose,
when the existence of any competition in dealing with them depends
upon the respondent's will."
"See (1922) 31 Comments, Yale Law Journal 652, and the authori-
ties there cited for arguments on both sides of the question, viz.:
Murchison Resale Price Maintenance (1919), Columbia University
Studies in Political Science, Vol. 82, No. 2; Gleiclk, Price Maintenance
(1917), 24 Case d Comment, 193.
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It must, however, be regarded as well settled that a man-
ufacturer may not maintain resale prices by a system of express
contracts with jobbers and dealers who trade in his products. 16
In other words, the manufacturer may not legally acquire a
7ight against the buyer that he shall not resell at other than the
price fixed by the manufacturer.
In the Beechnut case the plan of nerehandising of the
Beechnut Company was held an unfair method of competition,
because in the absence of "agreements express or implied," to
maintain resale prices it was quite as effectual to accomplish the
same purpose.17 In other words, the manufacturer's course of
dealing was illegal even though the buyer had a legal privslege
to cut prices.
The rule of the Beechnut case must now be considered as
fairly well settled.'8 The Ayer case may be distinguished from
the Beechnut case on the ground that the isolated instances, in
which it appeared in that case buyers from the manufacturer
tacitly agreed to maintain resale prices, did not evidence a gen-
eral merchandising policy on the part of the manufacturer such
as was condemned in the Beechnut case.' 9 Accordingly, apply-
ing the definition of unfair methods of competition adopted by
the Supreme Court, the Ayer case can be sustained on the ground
that the isolated acts complained of in the Ayer case did not tend
2*Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. (1911), 220 U.
S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct. 376. See also United States v. A. Schrader's Sons, Inc.
(1920), 252 U. S. 85; 40 Sup. Ct. 251.
"Beechnut Packing Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, supra, Note
4. In Frey & on v. Cudahy Packing Co. (1921), 256 U. S. 208, the
Supreme Court had previously stated, "the essential agreement, com-
bination or conspiracy 'to maintain resale prices might be implied' from
a course of dealing or other circumstances." 256 U. S. at p. 210. In the
net result, the Supreme Court would appear to regard price maintenance
by contracts or by tacit understandings as a difference merely of method.
Accordingly the presence or absence of "contracts" or "agreements" is
immaterial. See (1922) Comments, 31 Yale Law Journal 653-654.
"The Supreme Court has denied writs of certiorari to the Circuit
'Court of Appeals of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in two cases in
which the lower court found and condemned practices "substantially"
Identical with the facts in the Beechnut case. Mishawake Woolen Man-
ufacturers Company v. Federal Trade Commission (1923), 260 U. S.
748 (percuriam decision), and Hills Bros v. Federal Trade Commission,
supra, Note 9. In the latter case the opinion of the circuit court said:
"The case differs in degree and not in kind from the Beechnut
case. . . ." 9 Fed. 2d Series, at p. 485.
, The court so distinguishes the Beechnut case, stressing also the
lack of coercive or cooperative means to maintain prices used by the
Ayer concern.
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unduly to hinder competition between the various jobbers and
retailers.
However, an inconsistency occurs. If in occasional in-
stances a manufacturer may retain or reinstate a price-cutter
upon his list of customers upon receiving assurance from the
price-cutter that he will thereafter maintain resale prices, it
would seem that he should be permitted to accomplish the same
result in occasional instances by express contracts. Yet, apart
from whether a public interest is involved, such contracts are
generally unenforcible because they constitute illegal restraints
on alienation, by attempting to retain certain of the muniments
of title in the seller after title has passed to the buyer.
20
Assuming the rule of the Ayer case to be sound, it would
appear that in the absence of express contracts a manufacturer
may, in the occasional instance at least, and in the absence of a
settled course of dealing, retain or reinstate upon his list re-
formed price-cutters. In other words, that in determining
whether a particular policy towards price-cutters is an unfair
method of competition within the meaning of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, the courts will invoke a prin-





See Dunn Resale Price Maintenance (1923), 32 Yale Law Journal,
at p. 679. For an explanation of the rule of reason see the leading case
of United States v. American Tobacco Co. (1911), 221 U. S. 106, 55 L.
Ed. 663.
2In this connection it is interesting to note that in United States
v. Hudnut (D. C. S. N. Y. 1925), 8 Fed. 2d Series 1010, a bill in equity
was brought by the government under the Sherman Act to restrain the
defendant, a manufacturer of toilet articles, from maintaining resale
prices. The facts were not unlike those of the Ayer case. District
Judge Hand in dismissing the bill, expressed doubt as to its reason-
ableness.
"The wary manufacturer, however, will need to keep in mind the
words of the Supreme Court in Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers'
Association v. United States (1914), 234 U. S. 600, 58 L. Ed. 1490;
"It is elementary, however, that conspiracies (to maintain prices) are
seldom capable of proof by direct testimony and may be inferred from
things done . . ." i e., that isolated instances of selling to reformed
price-cutters, such as failed of condemnation in the principal case, are
admissible, and, in the absence of better, may be considered as evi-
dential of a general combination or conspiracy between the manu-
facturer and those who deal in his products.
